Dartmouth College

Dartmouth Digital Commons
Open Dartmouth: Published works by
Dartmouth faculty

Faculty Work

1-2017

Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India
Sam Asher
Development Research Group, World Bank

Paul Novosad
Dartmouth College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa
Part of the Economics Commons

Dartmouth Digital Commons Citation
Asher, Sam and Novosad, Paul, "Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India" (2017). Open
Dartmouth: Published works by Dartmouth faculty. 3043.
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa/3043

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Work at Dartmouth Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Open Dartmouth: Published works by Dartmouth faculty by an authorized
administrator of Dartmouth Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
dartmouthdigitalcommons@groups.dartmouth.edu.

Copyright American Economic Association; reproduced with permission of the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2017, 9(1): 229–273
https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150512

Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India†
By Sam Asher and Paul Novosad*
Political favoritism affects the allocation of government resources,
but is it consequential for growth? Using a close election regression
discontinuity design and data from India, we measure the local economic impact of being represented by a politician in the ruling party.
Favoritism leads to higher private sector employment, higher share
prices of firms, and increased output as measured by night lights; the
three effects are similar and economically substantive. Finally, we
present evidence that politicians influence firms primarily through
control over the implementation of regulation. (JEL D72, L51, O17,
O18, O43, R11)

F

irms rely on governments to provide a range of services, from tangible public
infrastructure to intangible institutions like the rule of law; the quality and efficiency of this service provision is arguably a major determinant of income differences across countries (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013). A wide academic literature
has established that political factors influence the timing and distribution of government inputs, in both rich and poor countries.1 While these studies systematically
show politically motivated changes in government behavior, there is little evidence
that these distortions affect economic outcomes.2 Yet identifying the economic
impacts of these distortions is essential to understanding whether they are minor
or consequential. In this paper, we develop multiple measures of local economic
* Asher: Development Research Group, World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, MC3-308, Washington, DC 20433
(e-mail: samuel.asher@gmail.com); Novosad: Department of Economics, Dartmouth College, 6106 Rockefeller
Center, Room 301, Hanover, NH (e-mail: paul.novosad@dartmouth.edu). We are thankful for useful discussions with Alberto Alesina, Josh Angrist, Lorenzo Casaburi, Shawn Cole, Eric Edmonds, Ed Glaeser, Ricardo
Hausmann, Richard Hornbeck, Lakshmi Iyer, Devesh Kapur, Asim Khwaja, Michael Kremer, Erzo Luttmer,
Sendhil Mullainathan, Rohini Pande, Ben Ranish, Andrei Shleifer, and David Yanagizawa, and to the many seminar
participants who provided helpful feedback. We are grateful to Francesca Jensenius for sharing data and to Sandesh
Dhungana, Pranav Gupta, and Kathryn Nicholson for excellent research assistance. Mr. PC Mohanan of the Indian
Ministry of Statistics has been invaluable in helping us use the Economic Census. This project received financial
support from the Center for International Development and the Warburg Fund (Harvard University). All errors are
our own.
†
Go to https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150512 to visit the article page for additional materials and author
disclosure statement(s) or to comment in the online discussion forum.
1
Some examples: Budgets are affected by electoral cycles (Rogoff 1990), ethnicity and electoral strategy influence the allocation of public goods (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Lizzeri and Persico 2005; Burgess et al. 2015), and
politically connected firms receive more credit and more bailouts (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 2006; Carvalho
2014).
2
A small number of studies point to potential economic impacts: Levitt and Poterba (1999) use panel estimation to show that states represented by senior Democratic congressmen grew more quickly from 1953–1990, as
did states with competitive House districts. Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2011) show that federal funds crowd out
corporate investment; they do not estimate a net impact on growth. Prakash, Rockmore, and Uppal (2015) find in
India that constituencies represented by politicians facing criminal accusations have lower night light intensity in
satellite images.
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activity in India, and provide robust evidence that political favoritism has economically large impacts on local private sector growth and economic output.
We estimate the local economic impacts of a widely acknowledged political distortion: the tendency of ruling parties to favor regions that are represented by their
members.3 We refer to these regions as ruling party constituencies. We use a close
election regression discontinuity design—comparing locations where ruling party
candidates narrowly won to locations where ruling party candidates narrowly lost—
to identify the impact of ruling party representation on economic growth. The context is state politics in post-liberalization India, where we can study the economic
impacts of a large number of staggered elections in a domain with political institutions and data collection methodology held constant.
India’s standard economic datasets report economic outcomes at a level of aggregation ten times larger than the legislative constituency, so it was necessary to
assemble new data.4 By matching the names of individual villages, we built a new
panel dataset from India’s Economic Census, which describes the location, industry,
and employment of every nonfarm establishment in India, covering 42 million firms
in 2005. We then matched these data to constituency boundaries, along with night
lights and headquarter locations of publicly traded firms.5 To our knowledge, this
is the first dataset linking firm-level outcomes to legislative constituencies in India.
We find that constituencies perform significantly better under ruling party candidates than under opposition candidates.6 They experience greater private sector
employment growth, and significantly increase light emissions, as measured by satellite, a proxy for economic growth. When a ruling party representative is elected,
we also find an immediate positive effect on stock prices, relative to when an opposition candidate is elected. All three effects are similar in magnitude and economically
important: they imply a 4–10 percentage point increase in economic growth over a
5-year electoral term. While none of these are direct measures of output, the similar
estimates on these three distinct correlates of growth point to an economically significant impact of ruling party affiliation on private sector growth.
The impact of ruling party affiliation on private sector employment appears to be
driven by reduced growth in opposition constituencies rather than increased growth
in ruling party constituencies. While the regression discontinuity approach does not
allow us to statistically distinguish between these two scenarios, this result would
3
A sample of such findings: Senate- and Congress-majority locations receive more federal grants than
minority districts (Albouy 2013). Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) finds a similar results in US state governments.
Municipalities with state-aligned incumbents in Brazil receive greater transfers than municipalities with nonaligned
incumbents (Brollo and Nannicini 2012). In Kenya, more roads are built in places that share ethnicity with the
president (Burgess et al. 2015), and in India, sugar mills with party-aligned chairmen pay higher prices (Sukhtankar
2012). These papers largely focus on government behavior rather than the economic impacts of politically motivated government actions.
4
In 2001, India had 593 districts and 4,090 legislative constituencies. India’s standard sample surveys, as well
as most of the research to date on India, are conducted at the district level.
5
All data sourced from the public domain will be published in a data Appendix with this paper. The Economic
and Population Censuses can be purchased respectively from the Ministry of Statistics in India (mospi.nic.in) and
the Census of India (censusindia.gov.in). A correspondence between Economic and Population Census village
identifiers and election constituency identifiers will be published in the data Appendix, along with replication files.
6
Note that a constituency’s ruling party membership is a characteristic of the political representative of a location, rather than the location itself. Nevertheless for simplicity, we will use the terms “ruling party constituency” and
“opposition constituency” to refer to constituencies represented by politicians of each type.
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fit with a model where politicians maximize electoral advantage both by delivering
goods and services to their own constituencies, and by reducing service quality in
opposition constituencies. Several other recent papers report deterioration of public
services in opposition locations. Using a regression discontinuity and data from
Brazil, Brollo and Nannicini (2012) conclude that the governing party systematically withholds funds from nonaligned municipalities. Hsieh et al. (2011) find that
the government of Venezuela specifically targeted citizens who revealed themselves
to be opposed to the government, and that these citizens were made poorer as a
result. Fafchamps and Labonne (2013) find that elected mayors deliberately withhold municipal jobs from relatives of their closest opponents; they also provide
a more thorough literature review of the use of political power to make targeted
groups worse off.7
Finally, we examine three potential mechanisms that could explain how politician
party affiliation could influence local growth: control over the implementation of
regulation, control over the supply of credit from state banks, and delivery of public
goods. To test the regulation hypothesis, we collected data on regulatory inputs to
a single sector, the mining sector.8 We find that state governments grant more mining permits and license more area for mining in ruling party locations, consistent
with our proposed regulatory channel. We do not find an impact of ruling party
status on delivery of public goods at the constituency level, nor do we find that
credit-dependent firms are disproportionally influenced by politicians.
Political influence over implementation of regulation by ostensibly neutral public
officials is widely recognized in India. These officials have the ability to hold up the
operations of firms in a number of ways, including limiting the supply of licenses
and permits, demanding bribes, and initiating tax and labor use audits, among others. This finding is consistent with evidence that state politicians in India act primarily not as legislators, but as “fixers,” or as mediators of the relationship between
citizens/firms and state officials (Chopra 1996; Jensenius 2013).9 We argue that
ruling parties use this power to facilitate service provision in constituencies they
represent (or to hinder service provision in opposition constituencies), in order to
improve voters’ perceptions of candidates affiliated with the ruling party.
Many past studies have focused on the inefficiency of specific politically motivated government actions, identifying them either as white elephants (Robinson and
Torvik 2005) or misallocations to unproductive factors (Khwaja and Mian 2005).
Our work relates closely to Cole (2009), who finds that agricultural credit from state
banks follows an electoral cycle, and targets swing districts. We do not observe disproportionate growth in swing constituencies, which is consistent with the finding in
7
For ease of exposition, we refer to these results going forward as gains for ruling party constituencies.
However, these are always gains relative to opposition constituencies, and could be driven in part or in whole by
losses in opposition constituencies.
8
We look at only one sector because microdata on regulatory inputs to local firms at high spatial resolution are
not widely available. We chose to focus on mining due to the high number of licenses and permits required, as well
as availability of data.
9
The idea that politicians wield direct control over regulatory obstacles is widespread in the media. Regarding
environmental clearances, ex-minister Jairam Ramesh is quoted as saying, “The chief minister would just call the
pollution control guy and say, ‘clear it.’ In the State, the chief minister is the king, he’s the sultan” (Barry and Bagri
2014). Bertrand et al. (2015) show that competence of senior Indian bureaucrats has a large impact on state-level
growth.
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Cole (2009) that political credit booms do not affect agricultural output. Our study
suggests that all firms are embedded in a political environment, and are potentially
constrained by the misallocation of government resources. Our methodology does
not permit us to make inferences about the aggregate impact of political behavior at
the national level; it is possible that we are observing reallocation of growth from
opposition to ruling party constituencies. However, large disparities in local growth
across the arguably random outcomes of narrowly decided elections are unlikely to
represent an efficient allocation.
These findings also contribute to a growing literature on public service delivery
and public sector incentives. Most of the work in this area has focused on public
sector workers who provide services directly to citizens, such as nurses and teachers
(Glewwe and Kremer 2006; Banerjee, Glennerster, and Duflo 2008; Callen et al.
2014); our work points to the importance of regulatory services delivered to firms.10
Past research has highlighted the role of democracy in improving the allocation
of government inputs (Brender and Drazen 2005; Burgess et al. 2015); this paper
provides evidence that electoral politics brings its own distortions, which can be
consequential for economic growth.
I. Background and Conceptual Framework

In this section, we describe the electoral system in India, review the roles of local
politicians, and describe a model of political decision-making that describes how
representation by ruling party politicians can affect the allocation of government
goods and services.
A. State Politics and Firms in India
We focus on the outcomes of state-level elections in India. State governments
are central actors in the allocation of government inputs. The Indian constitution
grants significant administrative and legislative power to state governments. States
incur 57 percent of total expenditures, and have administrative control over police,
provision of public goods, labor markets, land rights, money lending, state public
services, and retail taxes. States operate their own civil services, and in practice state
politicians exert a significant degree of control over federally appointed bureaucrats
assigned to their state (Iyer and Mani 2012). Surveys indicate that among all levels
of government, the majority of Indian citizens hold state governments responsible
for provision of public goods and public safety (Chhibber, Shastri, and Sisson 2004).
State elections use a first-past-the-post system. Candidates compete in elections
to represent single-member legislative constituencies; the candidate with a plurality
in a given constituency wins the seat. The party with the largest number of seats in
an election has the first opportunity to form a government; it may do so alone or as

10
Rasul and Rogger (2013) is an exception to the focus on service delivery to citizens; they study incentives in
the back offices of the Nigerian Civil Service, but do not address the role of electoral politics.
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part of a coalition.11 The essential feature of this system for our analysis is that a
given location may or may not be represented by a member of the party that controls
the government. Indian elections between 1990 and 2012 were competitive. In
addition to the two major national parties (Indian National Congress and Bharatiya
Janata Party), several regional and caste-based parties experienced electoral success
in state elections, and incumbent parties lost more often than they won.
State legislators (Members of the Legislative Assembly, or MLAs) in India have
little formal power over local government inputs. Legislatures are in session for on
average only 40 days each year, and most political decisions are taken by the executive (Chopra 1996). Local development funds for discretionary projects are small,
and equally available to MLAs, regardless of party.
The predominantly qualitative literature on Indian politicians emphasizes that
their primary role is to act as an intermediary between citizens and the state, to help
individuals and firms obtain inputs and services that they are ostensibly entitled to
by the state. State politicians spend the majority of their time dealing with constituent requests, and frequently make direct requests to bureaucrats or cabinet ministers
on behalf of constituents. Jensenius (2013) writes, “Maintaining an image of being
well-connected and getting things done is essential to the popularity of MLAs.”
The typical Indian firm has long been highly dependent on public officials and
government-supplied inputs in many areas of business. Under the License Raj,
India’s burdensome system of industrial regulation, firms needed state approval in
order to expand or contract production, import goods, add products, and hire or fire
workers. While the 1990s were a period of significant liberalization, the regulatory burden on firms remained high by international standards throughout the study
period (Panagariya 2008).
Public infrastructure is another major constraint to business in India that politicians could potentially alleviate. In 2005, 38 percent of Indian firms reported that
access to high quality roads or electricity infrastructure was a major or severe obstacle to growth, and many firms have resorted to private provision of these goods
(World Bank Enterprise Survey 2005). Firms in our sample period are also dependent on the state for access to credit. In 1990, nearly all banks were operated by the
state, making the government a monopolist supplier of formal credit; private banking grew through the sample period, but even by 2005, 54 percent of banking sector
employment remained in state-owned banks. Finally, state-owned firms remain an
important part of the economy.12
We treat all of these factors (implementation of regulation, access to public infrastructure and credit from state banks) as government inputs which can be controlled
by the ruling party and potentially used for political ends. The final part of this paper
aims to identify which of these factors drives the impact of ruling party politicians
on firms.

11
If the party fails to form a majority, the party with the next highest number of seats may try to form a majority
coalition.
12
In 1990, the public sector and state-owned firms accounted for 18.8 percent of nonfarm employment; by 2005
this number was 13.8 percent.
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B. Conceptual Framework
We developed a model to lend structure to our results. Appendix A presents the
full model of political behavior that provides a basis for preferential treatment of
ruling party constituencies, which we sketch out here. The model is related to the
redistribution model of Dixit and Londregan (1996), in which politicians either
direct government resources to swing voters (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987) or to
their core supporters Cox and McCubbins (1986). We show how these two behaviors can coexist: politicians deliver resources to their supporters (and withhold from
their opponents), but the distortions are magnified in swing districts.
In the model, politicians and parties are motivated strictly by reelection. The
governing party controls the allocation of government inputs across constituencies,
which include public goods, access to credit, and localized enforcement of regulations. Voters wish to elect high-quality candidates, but they face a signal extraction
problem. The ruling party can influence voters’ perceptions of local candidates by
putting more or fewer resources into a given constituency. This gives the party an
incentive to favor locations held by its own politicians, and to disfavor locations
held by party opponents, incentives that are magnified in swing constituencies. The
results hold even when voters expect this behavior from the government.
While the model focuses on fiscal resources for simplicity, it applies to any government services that the ruling party controls.13 It is useful to distinguish between
government inputs that lead to getting additional votes, and government inputs
that lead to growth. If all politically directed inputs are white elephants—projects
that are politically expedient but not economically valuable (Robinson and Torvik
2005)—we would predict that ruling party status would have no impact on local
growth. If the politically directed inputs are valuable to firms, then we would expect
to see higher growth in ruling party constituencies.
Political favors may also vary in the extent to which voters are able to determine who has provided them. If inputs are likely to be attributed to the ruling party,
regardless of local representation, we would expect them to be targeted to both ruling party and opposition constituencies, as in Cole (2009). Major state public works
like roads and electricity connections might fall into this category, as do direct gifts
from parties to voters.14 If inputs are more likely to be attributed to local political
leaders, we would expect them to be targeted toward ruling party constituencies
and away from opposition constituencies. Less directly observable inputs, such as
bureaucratic effort, could fall into this category.
Our empirical tests identify the impact of having a ruling party politician on
a location’s growth. If we find an effect, we can infer that (i) politicians allocate

13

We treat bureaucrats in charge of implementing regulation as direct agents of local politicians, which is an
oversimplification of a principal-agent relationship that has been explored elsewhere (Rasul and Rogger 2013; Nath
2015). This assumption fits our empirical context, in that we do not have data to test politician and bureaucratic
behavior separately.
14
A striking example is the laptop computers given to twelfth grade students in Uttar Pradesh, which are heavily
branded with the images of Samajwadi Party leaders (Paul 2014).
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government inputs differently across ruling party and opposition locations; and
(ii) those government inputs have an effect on economic outcomes.15
II. Data

We combine seven sources of data, which are described here. The standard economic datasets used in India report data at the level of districts, which are approximately ten times larger than legislative constituencies, which poses a barrier to
analysis of politician-level factors. We matched the village and town-level Economic
Census and Population Census of India to legislative constituencies, creating, to our
knowledge, the first dataset linking economic and population outcomes to legislative boundaries in India. The Economic Census of India is a complete enumeration
of nonfarm establishments; it includes firms that are both very small and very large,
formal and informal, and from both manufacturing and services sectors. We use the
Economic Censuses conducted in 1990, 1998, and 2005.16
The Economic Census is based on the house listing from the Population Census,
and records information on every nonfarm establishment in India, including location
(village for rural areas and ward-block for towns), the number of employees, the
main product,17 and whether the firm is public or private. More detailed information
on output or capital use is not included. The strengths of the data are its comprehensiveness, and rich detail on spatial location and industrial classification of firms; the
major limitation is the time gap between rounds.
The Economic Census is released as a cross section without local identifiers.
We obtained location directories from the Ministry of Statistics and Programme
Implementation, and used a series of fuzzy matching algorithms to match villages
and towns by name to the population censuses of 1991 and 2001. We were able to
match on average 2,923 (68 percent) towns and 515,114 (93 percent) villages.18 As
the Economic Census has not been widely used by researchers, we validated it by
comparing total employment in state-level, formal manufacturing firms to the more
widely used Annual Survey of Industries.19 We view the creation of a geocoded
panel dataset covering the universe of firms in India as an important contribution of
this work.20
15
Note that our emphasis is on identifying within-state distortions in the allocation of government inputs.
Policies with state-level effects, such as overall improvements in government performance or policies, are outside
the scope of this study.
16
The most recent census was conducted in 2012, but data was not available at the time of writing.
17
The number of industry categories reported in the Economic Censuses changes over time. Using concordance
tables from the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, we pooled groups to create consistent codes
over time, leaving 217 distinct industries.
18
The census defines towns as settlements with population over 5,000, where 75 percent of working men
do nonagricultural work. The match rate on towns is low because we are limited to places where boundaries are
unchanged across economic census observations. The regression discontinuity empirical strategy makes the match
rate less of a concern, because in expectation, the share of unmatched towns is the same in both ruling party and
opposition constituencies. We show in Appendix Table D6 that results are robust to limiting to employment in rural
areas, where the match rate is high.
19
Appendix B describes in more detail the correspondence between the Economic Census and Annual Survey
of Industry.
20
The dataset is a panel of locations, but a repeated cross-section of firms, as firm identifiers are not consistent
across census rounds. The correspondence between legislative constituency and population and economic census
identifiers will be available from the authors at time of publication.
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We obtained geographic coordinates for population census locations from a mapping firm (ML Infomap) and matched them to the bounding polygons of legislative
constituencies. All population and economic census data were then aggregated to
constituencies. We measure employment growth as change in log constituency-level
employment for two periods: from 1990 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2005.
We downloaded gridded average annual night light data from the website of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and matched the grid cells to
constituency polygons and election years.21 Night lights are a proxy for economic
growth that have the advantage of high resolution and objective measurement over
a 20+ year period (Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil 2011). The weakness of night
lights is that they may be biased by factors affecting light but not output, such as
electricity supply; we mitigate this weakness by testing for direct effects on electricity available, which we do not find. We define light growth as the increase in log
luminosity from the election year to the period five years after the election year.22
We downloaded election results for the period 1990–2012 from the website of the
Election Commission of India, and created a panel of political parties by manually
matching party names, taking into account party fragmentation and consolidation.23
We constructed state coalition alliances, and poll and election dates from newspaper
articles.
Ideally, we would match economic data directly to election years, but this is not
possible given the staggered election dates across states and the time gaps between
rounds of the Economic Census. Instead, we map each sequential pair of census
rounds to the earliest election that occurs in between the census rounds.24 We ignore
additional elections in the census period, and test robustness over different inclusion rules. Appendix Figure D3 illustrates this process and lists the elections in the
sample.25 Given that the economic outcome periods span seven or eight years, many
constituencies classified as having ruling party politicians will have some years of
opposition status in our measurement period, a treatment contamination that biases
downward our estimates of the relationship between alignment and growth.26
Figure 1 displays a map of ruling party and opposition constituencies used in analysis. As implied by the regression discontinuity design, there is no spatial correlation
between ruling party and opposition constituencies; they often share borders.
21
We calibrated the data to best rationalize the changing sensitivity of luminosity sensors over time and across
satellites; but this calibration does not affect results as all our specifications include year fixed effects. Luminosity
is measured on a top-coded 64 point scale.
22
Election terms can be shorter than five years under India’s parliamentary system, but we used the five-year
period to prevent confounding by factors causing governments to be replaced early.
23
The correspondence between current and past parties will be made available with the online Appendix.
24
In some cases, this is not the electoral period with the largest overlap with a given census period. For example,
Andhra Pradesh held elections in 1989, 1994, and 1998. We pair the 1994–1998 election term with the 1990–1998
Economic Census term. We do not use the 1989–1994 term, because any policy changes that occur before 1990
could affect the baseline observation.
25
We dropped Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in both periods because governments were so unstable as to make classification of candidates for an entire census period impossible. We dropped Assam in 1991 because the coalition party
ran as independents, making it impossible to identify party membership before the election.
26
If incumbents were always re-elected, our estimates would be unbiased, as our classification of candidates
would hold for the entire census period. But incumbency conveys a weak electoral disadvantage in Indian state
politics (Uppal 2009); subsequent elections are thus more likely to reverse our classification of places as ruling or
not ruling.
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Panel B. 1998

Opposition
Ruling party
Not in close sample

Figure 1. Sample Selection
Notes: The figure displays a map of the sample of ruling party and opposition constituencies
used in the Economic Census analysis. Panel A shows constituency ruling party status for the
period 1990–1998, and panel B shows constituency ruling party status for the period 1998–2005.
We coded ruling party status according to the first election after the baseline census for each
period; additional details are in Figure D3.
Source: Constituency boundaries: ML Infomap

For stock prices and market indices, we use monthly returns from Datastream,
Compustat, and Prowess. We matched companies to sectors using the Orbis Global
Company Database and to Indian legislative constituencies using headquarter postal
codes and postal code geocoordinates from the GeoNames pincode database. We
limited the sample to companies located outside of India’s ten major cities, as
companies located in major cities are less likely to have a significant share of their
operations in the constituency where their headquarters are located; this leaves 135
cities/towns in the sample.
We used industry-level measures of external finance dependence from Rajan and
Zingales (1998), which we matched to India’s National Industrial Classification.
Finally, we used data on the locations and dates of reconnaissance permits, prospecting licenses, and mining leases granted from the Bulletin of Mineral Information,
a publication of the Indian Bureau of Mines, which we matched to the population
census using village and district names.
All the nonproprietary data used in this analysis (night lights, mining clearances,
and election results) will be published with the paper, along with replication code.
For proprietary datasets (Economic and Population Census, stock prices), we will
publish merging code that allows purchasers of these datasets to merge them to the
legislative constituency identifiers.
III. Empirical Strategy

Our goal is to test whether locations with ruling party politicians experience different economic outcomes from opposition party locations.
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A. Local Economic Outcomes
The concern with regressing economic outcomes on constituency ruling party
status is that ruling party success could be correlated with unobserved factors that
affect growth. To account for unobserved differences between ruling party and
opposition constituencies, we focus on very close elections between ruling party and
opposition politicians. The underlying assumption of the regression discontinuity
strategy is that a constituency barely won by the ruling party candidate is similar to
a constituency barely lost by the ruling party candidate on all unobserved characteristics that are correlated with the dependent variable (Lee and Lemieux 2010). We
run a standard set of tests of this assumption below.27
Consider a state with candidates from two parties contesting each of many electoral seats. The party that obtains a plurality of seats becomes the ruling party.28 We
define ruling party status based on the ex post election result. In each constituency,
let v r represent the number of votes for the ruling party candidate, v o the votes for
the opposition candidate, and v tot the total number of votes. We define the running
variable margin in constituency c , state s, and time t as
r
o
− vcst
vcst
margincst = _______
.
tot
vcst

(1)

By construction, margincst is positive if the winning candidate in constituency c is
in the ruling party, and negative if she is in the opposition party. Following the terminology of Imbens and Lemieux (2008), margincst is the running or forcing variable,
and we define rulingcst as the treatment indicator, which is equal to one if margincst
is greater than zero.29 Since margincst may covary with the outcome variable, we
limit the test to locations with similar values of margincst. The population estimator
β is defined by
(2)

β = lim+ E[Yi | margini = m] − lim− E[Yi | margini = m].
m→0

m→0

We use two standard specifications to generate sample estimates of this parameter, following Imbens and Lemieux (2008). Both tests estimate, separately for ruling party and opposition constituencies, a regression of the outcome variable on
margin. The predicted outcome at the threshold where margin is equal to zero is then
compared across ruling party and opposition constituencies.
27

By construction, places with close elections are exactly those places where ruling party candidates are less
successful than average and opposition candidates are more successful than average (Caughey and Sekhon 2011;
Ferraz and Finan 2011). If success is correlated with candidate quality, then this biases our results downward,
because opposition politicians will be higher quality.
28
Appendix C extends the example to more than two parties.
29
Since ruling party status is determined by the ex post winner, there could be a concern that a single seat could
tip the balance, breaking the assumption that a constituency’s result is independent of the state ruling party determination. To test whether narrow victories could be driving our results, Appendix Table D3 presents results from the
subsample of states where the ruling coalition has a large cushion of seats, and thus the ruling party of the state is
independent from any individual constituency’s result.
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The first test uses a local linear regression, with a bandwidth of 5.1 percentage
points, optimally calculated according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). The
specification is described by equation (3):
(3)

Ycst = β0 + β1 1(margincst > 0) + β2 margincst
+ β3 margincst × 1(margincst > 0) + ζ Xcst + ηst + ϵcst,

where Ycst is a change in a constituency-level economic outcome, and Xcst is a vector of controls that consist of a lagged dependent variable, the share of population
and employment in rural areas, share of agricultural land that is irrigated, and the
presence of rural and urban public goods.30 ηst is a state-time fixed effect, ϵcst is
clustered by state-time, and observations are weighted with a triangular kernel to
put the greatest weight on the closest elections, where treatment and control constituencies are most similar. Constituency controls and fixed effects are not necessary
for identification but improve the efficiency of the estimation. β1 identifies the effect
of ruling party status.31
The second test regresses the outcome variable on a polynomial function of the
running variable margin across the entire sample of elections, and estimates a discontinuity at the point where margin becomes positive. The estimating equation is
(4)

Ycst = β0 + β1 × 1(margincst > 0) + f (margincst)
+ g(margincst) × 1(margincst > 0) + ζ Xcst + ηst + ϵcst,

where f ( · ) and g( · ) are polynomial functions with g(0) = 0 , and other variables
are defined as in equation (3). β1 estimates the effect of ruling party status at the
point where margincst = 0.
India is characterized by a large number of parties and candidates contesting
elections; in more than half of our sample the leading party was part of a coalition.
Appendix C explains how we extend the empirical strategy above to account for
more than two parties and dynamic coalition formation. In short, we assign parties
to coalitions based on information known before the election takes place. We use
newspaper articles or other documentation describing preelection coalitions, or if
we could not find a description of preelection coalition membership, we predict coalitions based on alliances from the previous election. This approach ensures that our
result is not biased by the possibility that some unobserved factor (e.g., candidate
competence) drives both entry into the ruling coalition and the economic outcome.
From this point forward, we use the term ruling party status to mean predicted ruling party status rather than ex post ruling party status.32 We exclude constituencies

30

Appendix Table D11 describes all control variables and their sources.
More precisely, the effect of ruling party status is identified by β1 + β3 × margin , at the point where margin
equals zero, so the second term drops out.
32
Results are robust to using ex post ruling party status rather than predicted ruling party status (Appendix
Table D3).
31
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where the top candidate ran as an independent, as we cannot observe whether independent candidates vote with or against the ruling coalition.33
B. Stock Prices
The second set of empirical tests examines whether stock prices increase in the
month following the election of a ruling party candidate in a firm’s headquarter
constituency. This serves two purposes. First, it directly tests for an impact of ruling
party status on firms; the stock price movement following the election of a ruling
party candidate is a good proxy for the expected future value of that firm. Second,
the stock price analysis identifies an impact tied precisely to the election month.
This mitigates the main weakness of the Economic Census analysis, which is the
mismatch between census periods and elections.
We use a repeated “event study” methodology, using monthly stock returns from
India’s two major stock exchanges, the Bombay Stock Exchange and the National
Stock Exchange. We use monthly data because of the long lag between voting and
official announcement of election results. Information is revealed throughout this
period, so it is not possible to identify a single date when the information is assimilated by the market.34 The estimation calculates election month abnormal returns for
all firms, and uses them as the outcome variable in the RD design described above.
For each event, we calculate cumulative abnormal returns as the residual from
a market model estimated on the 24 months prior to an election. We used clean
monthly returns and fitted betas from an amalgamation of Prowess, Compustat, and
Datastream, following the methods described in Campbell, Ramadorai, and Ranish
(2014). We again use equation (3), the local linear regression discontinuity specification, with cumulative abnormal return in the election month as the dependent
variable. As above, we cluster standard errors at the state-time level, and weight with
a triangular kernel.
The inclusion of the margin variables in equation (3) controls for the fact that
closer elections reveal more new information to the market. If a winner was widely
expected, we would expect the candidate’s effect to be priced in even before the
election; estimating equation (3) without the margin variable would thus bias β1
downwards.35
C. Balance Tests
The identifying assumption of the regression discontinuity is that constituencies where the ruling party candidate barely wins have similar unobservable
33
Candidates from unofficial parties are reported by the Electoral Commission as independents, so cannot be
distinguished from true independents and are excluded from the sample.
34
Voting often takes places on multiple days, and results may not be officially announced for days or weeks
after voting ends. We define the end of our period as the last day of the month in which official electoral results
were reported.
35
Note that the win margin is an imperfect measure of the uncertainty over the result in advance of an election. For example, if an election turns out to be closer than expected, we are overestimating the ex ante closeness.
However, we know of no data on advance polls or expectations of races for individual legislative constituencies,
hence our use of win margin as a proxy for ex ante closeness.
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Figure 2. Distribution of Running Variable (win margin)
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of win margin, or the vote share of the best performing
ruling party candidate minus the vote share of the best performing opposition candidate. Panel
A is a histogram of this margin across sample elections from 1990–2003, used in the main specification. Panel B plots a nonparametric regression to each half of the distribution following
McCrary (2008), testing for a discontinuity at zero. The point estimate for the discontinuity is
0.02, with a standard error of 0.09.

characteristics to constituencies where the ruling party candidate barely loses. This
notion is challenged by recent work by Grimmer et al. (2011), who find that candidates who enjoy structural advantages in US elections disproportionately win elections
that are very close.36 This would violate the identifying assumptions if, for example, powerful parties manipulated specific close elections, based on characteristics
unobserved by the researchers. Eggers et al. (2015) finds that Grimmers’ results are
an exception and that most US elections in fact support the identifying assumption.
Nevertheless, we take extra care to perform a large number of tests to demonstrate
that these types of advantages do not drive the outcomes of close elections in India.
We test for continuity of all baseline covariates around the treatment threshold, as
well as the density of the running variable. Figure 2 shows the density of the forcing
variable, margin. Constituencies with margin > 0 are those that were narrowly
won by ruling party politicians, while those with margin < 0 were narrowly lost by
ruling party politicians. Panel A shows the distribution of the win margin across our
sample of Indian elections from 1990 to 2012. There is no apparent excess density to
the right of zero.37 Panel B shows the fit of a McCrary test of continuity in the density of the running variable around the treatment threshold of zero (McCrary 2008).
The test does not reject continuity in the running variable at the win/loss threshold,
indicating that ruling party candidates do not have the ability to selectively push
themselves across the win margin.
Appendix Figure 3 runs tests analogous to those performed by Grimmer et al.
(2011). We analyze the tendency of close elections to be won or lost by candidates
with two types of structural advantage: (i) local incumbency or (ii) membership
36
Examples of structural advantages include alignment with the state ruling party, the state Governor, or the
Secretary of State’s office.
37
The mode of the margin distribution is to the right of zero because on average the ruling coalition wins more
often than it loses.
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Figure 3. Mean Structural Advantage of Candidates and Margin of Victory/Loss
Notes: These figures test whether candidates with privileged positions can disproportionately win close elections.
The figures plot the candidate-level conditional expectation function of the probability of a candidate having an
electoral structural advantage on the y-axis against the candidate’s margin of victory or loss on the x-axis. In both
panels, margin is defined as the vote share of the candidate minus the highest scoring opponent. Negative values
indicate that the candidate was an election loser. Within each percentage point-sized bin, the point indicates the
share of candidates with that result who were (panel A) incumbents or (panel B) members of the ruling party at the
time of election. The sample is all candidates from 1990 to 2005. If structurally advantaged candidates did better in
close elections, we would see a positive shift at the win (zero) threshold.

in an incumbent coalition, that is, a party in control of state institutions when the
election takes place. Each point in the figure represents the mean share of candidates
with structural advantage, among candidates who won or lost by the margin on the
x-axis. If advantaged candidates did better in close elections, we would see more of
them winning by small margins than losing. We find no evidence for this.
Table 1 shows constituency means of all variables at baseline, displayed separately for locations that end up with ruling party and opposition status. The t statistic
for the difference of means is displayed in column 3, while columns 4 and 5 show
the point estimates and t statistics of estimating equation (3) on pretreatment constituency characteristics. The coefficient on the threshold variable (the ruling party
dummy) is significant at the 10 percent level in only 1 of these 13 cases (rural electrification) and at the 5 percent level in none, indicating that treatment is balanced
across pretreatment characteristics of constituencies. Figure 4 plots the expectation
of each outcome conditional on the forcing variable, margin , with allowance for a
discontinuity at the ruling party win/loss threshold.38 Consistent with Table 1, there
is no noticeable difference between constituencies narrowly won and narrowly lost
by ruling party candidates.39

38

Graphs for the remaining baseline variables are in Appendix Table D4.
In spite of the widely documented corruption and electoral fraud in India, we find no imbalances around
close elections. It is worth noting that India’s federal electoral commission is perceived to have been an island
of bureaucratic excellence since independence, explaining the country’s largely non-violent history of elections.
Indian incumbents are also not particularly entrenched; both state parties and politicians turn over very frequently
in the period studied. Finally, the relative lack of polling in many state elections implies that politicians may not
know which electoral races will be close, making it more difficult for richer parties to precisely target funds to the
closest races.
39
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Table 1—Summary Statistics
Variable
Baseline employment
Baseline public sector employment
Number of establishments
Mean firm size
Baseline population
Urban population share
Share of villages with paved access road
Share of villages with power supply
Rural primary schools per village
Share of land that is irrigated
Urban paved roads (km)
Urban electricity connections
Urban primary schools

Ruling party
constituencies

Opposition
constituencies

t-stat on
difference

RD
estimate

t-stat on
RD estimate

12,547
2,107
5,313
2.36
162,430
0.25
0.59
0.85
0.87
0.20
13.41
3,214
8.81

12,894
2,187
5,373
2.35
177,099
0.24
0.61
0.84
0.86
0.13
13.01
2,958
9.62

−0.58
−0.49
−0.24
0.08
−1.68
0.20
−0.65
0.28
0.91
2.84
0.28
0.57
−0.81

829
337
274
0.03
8,603
0.06
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.01
5.99
1,741
3.00

0.73
0.89
0.80
0.31
1.66
1.33
0.09
1.49
0.03
0.74
1.41
1.37
1.49

Notes: The table presents mean values for all variables used, measured in the baseline period. The baseline period
is 1990 for employment variables and 1991 for other variables. Column 1 shows means for constituencies that
eventually elect ruling party candidates, while column 2 shows means for constituencies that elect opposition candidates. Column 3 shows the t-statistic for the difference of means across columns 1 and 2. Column 4 shows the
kernel regression discontinuity estimate of the effect of ruling party status on the baseline variable, and column 5
is the t-statistic for this last estimate.
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Figure 4. Balance Tests: Baseline Variables versus Ruling Party Win Margin
Notes: The figures plot the conditional expectation function of baseline constituency characteristics, conditioning on the win margin of the ruling party candidate. Points to the right of zero are seats won by ruling parties,
while points to the left of zero are seats lost by ruling parties. Each point represents approximately 60 observations. A fourth degree polynomial function is fitted separately to each side of 0, with 95 percent confidence intervals displayed.
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Table 2—Effect of Ruling Party Status on log Employment Growth
Jobs: Local linear

Ruling party
Margin of victory
Margin × ruling
Baseline log employment
State-year fixed effects
Constituency controls
Observations
R2

Jobs: Polynomial

Lights: Local linear

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.014
(0.005)
−0.175
(0.164)
0.190
(0.212)

0.014
(0.004)
−0.144
(0.155)
0.072
(0.229)
−0.021
(0.004)

0.009
(0.004)

0.009
(0.004)

0.040
(0.020)
−0.908
(0.641)
0.708
(0.786)

0.038
(0.018)
−1.225
(0.580)
1.387
(0.693)
−0.127
(0.020)

Yes
No
768
0.16

Yes
Yes
742
0.26

Yes
No
3,712
0.15

Yes
No
2,240
0.47

Yes
No
2,240
0.59

−0.019
(0.002)
Yes
Yes
3,521
0.24

Notes: The table shows regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of having a ruling party politician on annualized constituency log employment growth (columns 1–4) and on change in log average night light emissions over
the five years following an election (columns 5–6). Columns 1–2 and 5–6 present triangular kernel-weighted local
linear estimates (equation (3)), and columns 3–4 present full sample polynomial estimates (equation (4)). All columns include state-time fixed effects, so constant terms are not displayed. Columns 2 and 4 add lagged constituency controls, which are baseline log employment, share of population in rural areas, share of employment in rural
areas, share of agricultural land that is irrigated, rural and urban primary schools, health centers, roads, and electricity connections. Column 6 adds a lagged dependent variable, the only baseline control consistently available across
the night light time series. Standard errors are clustered at the state-time level.

IV. Results

This section provides evidence that ruling party constituencies have significantly
higher private sector employment growth, greater GDP as proxied by night lights,
and higher stock prices of firms. We conclude with suggestive evidence that implementation of regulation drives these results.
A. Economic Outcomes
Table 2 presents regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of ruling party
status on constituency-level log employment growth. Column 1 presents local linear
regression estimates from equation (3). The estimate on Ruling Party indicates that
where elections were closest, constituencies with ruling party politicians grew 1.4
log points more per year than opposition constituencies, over a seven year period.40
Columns 2 adds a lagged dependent variable and lagged constituency-level controls.
Columns 3 and 4 present estimates from the full sample polynomial specification
(equation (4)) on the same outcome. The polynomial specification generates slightly
smaller estimates of 0.9 log points per year, with similar statistical significance to
40
This corresponds to 10.7 percent over the entire time between Economic Census rounds, or 7.3 percent over
a normal five-year electoral term. The 5-year rate is the best estimate of the total effect, as most electoral terms
in our sample did last 5 years, and only 1 out of the 25 terms in our sample ended before the following Economic
Census round.
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the local linear specification.41 Columns 5 and 6 present estimates from the same
equation using log average constituency luminosity from night lights. These estimates suggest a 4 percentage point increase in 5-year light growth.42
Figure 5 plots the conditional expectation of log employment growth (top panel)
and log light growth (bottom panel) on the y-axes, with the win margin for the ruling party candidate on the x-axis. Each point represents the mean outcome growth
in the set of constituencies in the given margin range. Locations just to the right of
zero (the solid vertical line) were narrowly won by ruling party candidates, while
locations just to the left of zero were narrowly lost. The regression lines show the
value and 95 percent confidence interval of a fourth degree polynomial function
fitted to the raw data, with separate specifications for ruling party and opposition
candidates. The jump in the regression line at zero is a visual analog of the estimates
in Table 2.43
We draw attention to three characteristics of these graphs. First, the effect of
ruling party politicians is large and significant when elections are close. Second, the
ruling party effect appears to be highly local; constituencies won by a large margin
do not appear to grow at different rates from those lost by a large margin. This finding is consistent with the model: politicians target their energy to competitive constituencies, as these investments have the highest potential electoral returns. Finally,
the employment effect appears to be driven by lower growth in opposition constituencies, rather than higher growth in ruling party constituencies. The regression
discontinuity strategy allows for causal inference only on the net difference between
these two effects, so we cannot statistically distinguish between these two scenarios,
and the night lights graph (bottom panel) is less asymmetric. However, it is worth
noting that the model predicts effects on both sides of the threshold: ruling parties
aim to both improve service delivery in the places they have won, and to worsen
service delivery in the places they have lost.44 For the remainder of the paper, we
refer to these as positive effects of ruling party status, but they could just as well be
taken as negative effects on opposition constituencies.
A natural question is whether increased hiring in government-owned firms is
driving this effect. Table 3 presents estimates of equation (3), separately for employment in private and government-owned establishments, the latter of which include
administrative offices of government. Columns 1 and 2 report estimates for public
firms, respectively, with and without constituency controls, and columns 3 and 4
show the same for private firms. The point estimates for public and private firms are
41
Appendix Table D2 runs standard placebo tests of these regressions, with simulated discontinuities at the first
and third quartile of the distribution of the win margin, as suggested by Imbens and Lemieux (2008). The placebo
estimates are insignificant and close to zero. Appendix Figure D5 plots estimates from equation (3) with a range of
bandwidths, an alternate kernel and a different window of election years. The local linear results are very stable; the
polynomial estimates bound the linear estimates, but are sensitive to inclusion of observations with very large win
margins. As discussed by Gelman and Imbens (2014), this sensitivity suggests we should focus on the local linear
estimates, which we do for the remainder of the paper. However for the sake of completeness the accompanying
figures fit a curve to the full sample.
42
Table D4 shows all these estimates with a rectangular kernel instead of the triangular kernel used in the main
specification.
43
Appendix Figure D6 displays these graphs within the optimal bandwidth of 5.1 percent and a linear best fit.
44
Appendix Figure D6 is the visual analog to the local linear specification, and makes it apparent why claims
about symmetry or asymmetry are difficult in regression discontinuity.
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Figure 5. log Employment Growth versus Win Margin of Ruling Party Candidate
Notes: The figure plots the conditional expectation function of the mean of log employment
growth (panel A) and mean log luminosity growth (panel B), conditioning on the win margin of
the ruling party candidate. Points to the right of zero indicate growth in locations won by the ruling party candidate, while points to the left of zero indicate growth in locations lost by the ruling
party candidate. A fourth degree polynomial function is fitted separately to each side of 0, and 95
percent confidence intervals are displayed.
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Table 3—Effect of Ruling Party Status on log Employment Growth:
Private Sector versus Public Sector
Public sector

Ruling party
Margin of victory
Margin × ruling
Baseline log public employment

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.006
(0.011)

0.012
(0.008)

0.013
(0.006)

0.012
(0.005)

−0.180
(0.291)
0.586
(0.535)

Baseline log private employment
State-year fixed effects
Controls
Observations
R2

Private sector

−0.144
(0.236)
0.220
(0.421)
−0.043
(0.012)

−0.134
(0.173)
0.163
(0.211)

Yes
Yes
742
0.41

Yes
No
768
0.14

Yes
No
768
0.27

−0.094
(0.167)
0.039
(0.237)
−0.023
(0.004)
Yes
Yes
742
0.24

Notes: The table shows kernel regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of having a ruling party politician on constituency log employment growth. The dependent variable in columns
1–2 is log employment growth in public sector firms. The dependent variable in columns 3–4 is
log employment in private sector firms. Standard errors are clustered at the state-time level. All
columns include state-time fixed effects, so constant terms are not displayed. The differences
between private and public point estimates are not statistically significant: the p-values for this
difference, respectively with and without controls, are 0.57 and 0.74.

statistically indistinguishable, and the private firm effects are nearly identical to the
full sample effects. We can thus rule out that the effect of ruling party politicians on
employment growth is driven by public sector hiring.45
B. Stock Prices
We now test whether a firm’s stock market valuation changes when a ruling party
candidate is elected in the constituency of the firm’s headquarters.46 If an election
between a ruling party and an opposition party candidate is expected to be close, the
preelection share price of a local firm will be a weighted mean of the value of the firm
under a ruling party politician, and the value of the firm under an opposition party
politician. After the election, the uncertainty is resolved and the share price reflects
the value of the firm under the winning politician (Malatesta and Thompson 1985).
By comparing stock returns of firms in locations where the ruling party candidate

45

Standard errors are larger because there are fewer firms in each group; the sample size remains constant
because the unit of observation is the constituency. Table D5 shows estimates with a rectangular kernel.
46
The use of stock prices to identify the importance of political factors to firm value was first demonstrated by
Roberts (1990) and has been used by Fisman (2001) and Jayachandran (2006). While the latter papers are based
on direct relationships between politicians and individual firms (based respectively on family and political contributions), we focus on the inherent relationship between a firm’s place of business and the local politician there.
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Table 4—Effect of Ruling Party Status on Postelection Stock Returns
Cumulative abnormal
return (CAR)

(1)
Ruling party

0.096
(0.029)

(2)

CAR (placebo)

t−1

t−2

0.082
(0.040)

−0.011
(0.051)

−0.040
(0.027)

3.715
(1.141)

−0.030
(1.258)

0.344
(1.132)

−2.351
(0.701)

−3.200
(1.025)

State-year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry fixed effects
Observations
R2

No
793
0.14

Yes
615
0.27

No
793
0.09

No
793
0.38

Margin of victory
Margin × ruling

1.795
(1.085)

−0.006
(0.888)

0.438
(0.815)

Notes: The table shows regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of having a ruling party
politician on the cumulative abnormal returns of firms in the month following an election. The
independent variable Ruling party indicates that the winner of the constituency in the firm’s
headquarters location is a member of a state-level ruling party. Returns are measured against
a market model with a value-weighted index of Indian securities representing the market, controlling for individual stock betas. Column 1 is the standard specification with state-time fixed
effects. Column 2 adds industry fixed effects. The final two columns are placebo tests, where the
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return in the month before (column 3) and two
months before (column 4) the election. Standard errors are clustered at the state-time level, and
constant terms are omitted due to the fixed effects.

won with those where the ruling party candidate lost, we estimate the value placed
by the market on having a ruling party politician.47
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 report estimates from equation (3), and identify
the effect of ruling party status on the share prices of local firms under state-year
and state-year-industry fixed effect specifications.48 The election of a ruling party
politician causes a positive abnormal return in the range of 8 to 10 percent in the
month following the election. Columns 3 and 4 are placebo tests, using the cumulative abnormal return in the month before the election as the dependent variable.49
As expected, the placebo coefficients are small and not statistically distinguishable
from zero. Figure 6 plots a graphical analog of the main and placebo specifications, showing abnormal returns to ruling party constituencies in each of the six
months before and after an election. Abnormal returns are positive in month one,
and close to zero for all following months, suggesting that the election month shock

47
A single firm’s price response to the election of a ruling party candidate would capture a combination of the
economic effect of ruling party status with the estimated ex ante probability of the ruling party candidate winning.
By comparing price movements of firms in locations that elect ruling party politicians with those that elect opposition politicians, we will capture the full economic effect, as long as we have a sufficient number of firms in locations
with close elections.
48
The observation count falls as we add sector fixed effects because we were not able to match all firms to
Orbis, the data source for company metadata. Appendix Table D10 shows estimates with a rectangular kernel.
49
Appendix Table D9 shows the full set of placebo results in the year around election. None are statistically
significantly different from zero or large in magnitude compared with the election month effect.
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Effect of ruling party on monthly return
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Figure 6. Effect of Ruling Party Status on Monthly Abnormal Returns Near Time of Election
Notes: The figure shows point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals from a firm-level regression of
market-adjusted monthly abnormal return (AR) on the ruling party status of the constituency in which the firm is
headquartered. Regressions include state-year fixed effects and controls for major parties, and standard errors are
clustered at the state-time level. The figure shows ARs in the months leading up to the election of a ruling party
candidate to the left of zero on the x-axis, and ARs in the months after the election of a ruling party candidate to the
right of zero on the x-axis.

is persistent. Figure 7 (left panel) shows the standard regression discontinuity treatment plot, with margin on the x-axis.50
This result tells us three things: (i) The effects of ruling party politicians on total
employment and night lights are corroborated by stock market data; (ii) market traders are aware of this effect and price it into stocks; and (iii) the timing of valuation
changes matches election dates precisely. This last point should alleviate concern
over the imperfect match between election periods and the timing of the Economic
Census. The stock market results are very similar in magnitude to the results from
the Economic Census and night lights. The Economic Census estimates indicated a
7.3 percentage point increase in employment growth over a 5-year electoral term,
while the night light estimates suggested a 4 percentage point increase in 5-year
growth. The stock price growth estimates of 7–10 percent capture the change in the
capitalized value of the benefits the firm will receive over the entire electoral period,
and are thus highly similar to the Economic Census results. It is worth noting that
publicly traded firms are on average very different from Economic Census firms.
Publicly traded firms are among the largest firms in the country; Economic Census
firms have a mean employee count of 2.4 (Table 1). It is likely that these different
types of firms are influenced by politicians through different channels; but the evidence indicates that both types of firms benefit from political favoritism.

50

Appendix Figure D7 plots the same results within the regression bandwidth.
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Figure 7. Effect of Ruling Party Status on Stock Returns and Mining Clearances
Notes: The figures plot the conditional expectation function of the dependent variable, conditioning on the win margin of the ruling party candidate. The dependent variable in panel A is monthly abnormal stock return in constituencies that elect ruling party candidates. The dependent variable in panel B is an indicator that takes the value 1 if
a reconnaissance permit, prospecting license, or mining lease was granted in the constituency during the electoral
cycle. Points to the right of zero indicate outcomes in locations won by the ruling party candidate, while points to
the left of zero indicate outcomes in locations lost by the ruling party candidate. A fourth degree polynomial function is fitted separately to each side of 0, and 95 percent confidence intervals are displayed.

C. Mechanisms
This section provides evidence on potential mechanism driving the growth effects
identified above. We focus on three channels that could plausibly be important, given
the previous literature: regulation, credit, and provision of public goods.
India’s regulatory state has been widely considered a major impediment to
growth since independence (e.g., Panagariya 2008), and there is evidence that politicans play a key role in enforcement of regulation through control over bureaucrats (Jensenius 2013; Nath 2015). However, data on enforcement of regulation are
sparse at a local level; the state-level indicators used in other studies (e.g., Aghion
et al. 2008) cannot be matched to specific politicians. We therefore turn to a single
regulation-intensive sector for which we were able to collect geocoded information
on the supply of licenses and permits: mining.51 Table 6 reports estimates of equation (3), the primary regression discontinuity specification, on outcomes related to
granting of mining clearances.52 In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is an
indicator that takes the value one if any mining permits were granted in the electoral cycle. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the log of the total area
of permitted mines. The estimates show that having a ruling party politician causes
more mines to be permitted, and for larger areas to be given to mining firms.53 The
right panel of Figure 7 shows the graphical analog of this result.54 While we cannot
51

State governments have the authority to grant or refuse requests for such permits and licenses under the Mines
and Minerals Development and Regulation Act of 1957.
52
Table D10 shows estimates with a rectangular kernel.
53
The Bureau of Mines does not report application dates or rejected applications, so we cannot test whether
applicants time their applications to coincide with ruling party candidates. If this takes place, these results may be
driven by applications rather than state government choices; nevertheless, such an interpretation would suggest that
firms expect more support from ruling party politicians.
54
Appendix Figure D7 shows the treatment effect within the bandwidth used in regressions.
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Table 5—Effect of Ruling Party Status on log Employment Growth, Interactions
with Business Credit-Dependence
Dependent variable: Constituency log employment growth
Ruling party low financial dependence (industry)
Ruling party high financial dependence (industry)
Difference (industry)
Ruling party low financial dependence (location)
Ruling party high financial dependence (location)
Difference (location)

(1)

(2)

0.009
(0.007)
0.012
(0.010)
0.003
(0.014)

0.008
(0.007)
0.013
(0.010)
0.005
(0.014)

(3)

(4)

0.024
(0.013)
0.020
(0.012)
−0.004
(0.021)

0.024
(0.014)
0.020
(0.012)
−0.004
0.021)

Notes: The table shows regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of having a ruling party politician on annualized constituency log employment growth, interacted with credit dependence. Rows 1 and 2 show estimates of
the impact of ruling party status on log employment growth for subsets of firms, with respectively below and above
median dependence on external finance, as defined by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Row 3 shows the difference
between the estimates in rows 1 and 2. Column 1 uses the mean industry external finance, and column 2 uses the
median. Rows 4 and 5 show estimates of the impact of ruling party status on log employment growth in, respectively, regions with below- and above-median employment in credit-dependent sectors, again as defined by Rajan
and Zingales (1998). Row 6 shows the difference between the estimates in rows 4 and 5. Column 3 uses the mean
industry external finance, and column 4 uses the median. Specifications are identical to Table 2: all regressions
include state-time fixed effects, standard errors are clustered at the state-time level, and baseline constituency characteristics are controlled for, including the log value of employment at baseline.

establish a direct causal link between mineral clearances and growth, this result
suggests that enforcement of regulation could be an important channel for the real
impacts of political favoritism.
Next, we turn to credit. Previous studies have shown that access to credit from
state banks often depends on political factors. Carvalho (2014) finds that politically
motivated credit has real effects, while Cole (2009) finds that it has none. To test
whether credit availability is a possible channel for the employment effects of political favoritism, we examine whether the regression discontinuity estimates are larger
for credit-dependent firms or locations. Using industry measures of dependence on
external financing described in Rajan and Zingales (1998), we partition our data
into (i) firms in industries that have above and below median credit dependence;
and (ii) locations with above and below median concentrations of employment in
credit-dependent firms, i.e., places with a high concentration of credit-dependent
firms. In both cases, we define medians such that there are an equal number of
people employed in industries/locations with high and low credit dependence. We
use seemingly unrelated regression and equation (3) to estimate the difference in
regression discontinuity point estimates between the two subgroups.55
Table 5 reports regression discontinuity estimates of the impact of ruling party politicians on employment growth, partitioned according to credit dependence of firms
55
It would be preferable to use direct firm data on credit-dependence, but such a measure is not available in our
data, nor to our knowledge in any large-scale census of firms.
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Table 6—Effect of Ruling Party Status on Granting of Clearances
for Mining Activities
Permit dummy
Dependent variable
Ruling party
Margin of victory
Margin × ruling
State-election fixed effects
Observations
R2

log permit area granted

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.045
(0.022)
−0.231
(1.362)
0.716
(2.240)
No

0.033
(0.015)
0.706
(1.861)
1.112
(1.769)
Yes

0.326
(0.156)
−1.113
(5.759)
−2.113
(11.114)
No

0.269
(0.125)
2.580
(8.151)
−0.683
(9.665)
Yes

352
0.01

352
0.22

352
0.01

352
0.17

Notes: The table shows kernel regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of having a ruling party politician on outcomes related to mining permits. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent
variable is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a reconnaissance permit, prospecting
license, or mining lease was granted in the constituency during the given electoral cycle. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the log total area of licenses and leases granted. Standard
errors are clustered at the state-time level. All columns include state-time fixed effects, so constant terms are not displayed.

and locations. Columns 1 and 2 show estimates with firm-level partitions according to industry credit dependence. The third row shows the difference in regression
discontinuity estimates between high and low credit-dependent firms. Column 1
uses the median industry external finance dependence and column 2 uses the mean.
Columns 3 and 4 repeat this exercise, but with locations with concentrations of
firms with high and low credit dependence. The point estimates on the differences
are small and statistically insignificant; they are negative for the location partitions.
These results, consistent with Cole (2009), suggest that politically directed credit is
unlikely to explain the large effect of political favoritism on employment growth.56
Finally, we examine whether public infrastructure could explain the impact of
political favoritism on growth. Appendix Tables D7 and D8 show results from estimating equation (3) on changes in urban and rural public goods between 1991 and
2001. We find no statistically significant effects, though the standard errors on the
urban sample leave open the possibility of moderately positive effects. It does not
appear that differential investment in public goods is driving the impact of politicians on firms.57 The lack of finding on electricity provision also supports the interpretation of the night lights effect as a proxy of growth rather than an indicator of
increased availability of electricity.

56
Note that industry credit-dependence is not randomly assigned, and it remains possible that unobserved variation correlated with the industry variable is masking the true treatment heterogeneity.
57
These findings are consistent with other work on India, which finds that citizen mobilization and national
political agendas have played the dominant role in determining which regions gained public goods (Banerjee, Iyer,
and Somanathan 2005; Banerjee and Somanathan 2007).
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V. Conclusion

Government-provided goods and services are essential inputs to firms in developing countries, inputs that are often distributed with discretion by government
actors. This paper draws on multiple data sources to show that politician identity
has a robust effect on local economic growth in India, as measured by employment
growth, night lights, and stock prices. All three outcome variables suggest that the
election of a ruling party politician leads to a 4–10 percent increase in local economic growth. While each of these measures is an imperfect proxy of growth by
itself, the consistent estimates across these three categories and only partially overlapping samples of elections and measurement horizons suggests that these growth
effects are real and widespread. We present suggestive evidence that variation in the
enforcement of regulation is the channel with the greatest real impacts. Our results
support a model where the governing party strategically allocates government services, privileging ruling party constituencies and/or harming opposition constituencies. The economically substantive impact of ruling party representation on growth
suggests that firms depend a great deal on locally delivered government inputs, and
marginal changes in the delivery of those inputs can have large impacts on firm
performance.
The number of potential channels by which regulatory discretion can affect private sector outcomes in India is large, which may explain why we find that political
favoritism is important for both small and very large firms. India’s 1947 Industrial
Disputes Act, still in place, requires companies above a certain size to seek government permission before firing any workers (Besley and Burgess 2004). Both
politicians and bureaucrats have the ability to initiate tax audits and investigations;
they can also influence the intensity of investigations that have already begun.
Politicians’ control over bureaucrats, exercised through the threat of position reassignment (Iyer and Mani 2012; Nath 2015), gives them another means of influencing local implementation of regulatory policy. While the well-known restrictions
of the License Raj were lessened during the study period, the licensing requirements for Indian businesses remain high by international standards, giving public
officials ample opportunity to hold up local firms. Less lawfully, police and even
low-level bureaucrats can make life difficult even for firms that are complying with
regulations. In our discussions with small firm owners, we have repeatedly heard
tales of harassment by police and other public officials, and Fisman and Svensson
(2007) find that the bribery rate is a significant constraint on growth in a sample of
small firms.
The lack of findings on local public goods and credit suggests that either
these goods are not being strategically allocated based on ruling party status, or the political allocation of these goods does not create a major impediment to firm growth in India. Why should control over regulation be more
important than other possible government inputs controlled by the governing
party? While we cannot answer this question empirically, we speculate that
(i) changes in the implementation of regulation can be operationalized immediately, as opposed to public goods, which can take years to contract and
build; (ii) regulation is one of the most binding constraints on many Indian
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firms;58 and (iii) the local enforcement of regulation may be exactly what citizens
expect effective local politicians to be able to influence, while other major state
expenditures are attributed to the governing party rather than its local representative. A politician is evaluated in part for his ability to influence local bureaucrats
(Jensenius 2013). By encouraging bureaucrats to be more or less helpful, the ruling party can directly influence a politician’s perceived competence among voters.
Finally, increasing the enforcement of regulation (even if disproportionately in some
places) can give a party the appearance of protecting the public interest, especially
in India, where suspicion of industry remains high.
Several other studies have found political impacts on public infrastructure and
public employment, such as Albouy (2013); Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2011); and
Ferraz and Monteiro (2012); we do not find large effects in these areas. One reason
could be that India’s regulatory state gives politicians a cheap policy tool that is less
easily manipulated in other countries. The lack of political discretion over implementation of regulation in other countries may motivate politicians to turn to more
costly policy levers.59
The economic impact of political distortions on economic growth remains an area
with little research, in spite of a large number of studies identifying political misallocation. Democracy is successful in part by aligning incentives of politicians with
the interests of voters. This alignment can break down when the politically expedient allocation of government resources is not the efficient allocation. Understanding
where the consequences of such misalignment are most consequential is an important area for future research.
Appendix A: Model
There are two parties, A and B , with respective policies on a one-dimensional
continuum, XA and XB. Without loss of generality, let A be the ruling party. The ruling party allocates a fixed amount of government resources across K constituencies,
K
assigning γk to constituency k , subject to the budget constraint ∑k=1 γk = 1.
Each constituency has two politicians, characterized by an inherent ability θi, k ,
where θ ∈ [ 0, 1 ] , E(θ ) = 0.5, and i ∈ { A, B}. This represents the politician’s
ability to bring useful government inputs to his constituency. After allocations have
been decided by the central party, the value of government inputs received by voters
in constituency k is equal to γk · θI, k , where I represents the incumbent politician in
constituency k. A low-ability candidate dissipates the value of government inputs;
this could be because he allows them to be stolen or because he obtains inputs that
are not useful to his constituency. All candidates are committed to the policy position of their party.
Supporting the latter notion, Iyer and Mani (2012) find that a large amount of bureaucratic assignment
takes place immediately after elections, the majority of it in opposition constituencies. A second reason for the
non-finding on infrastructure in our study may be that roads and electricity lines exist as parts of networks and may
be difficult to deploy along constituency boundaries, particularly since closely won ruling party constituencies often
abut opposition constituencies.
59
While electricity provision is thought to be highly politicized in India, the real short-term impacts may be
mitigated by the fact that many firms in India use generators to supply their own electricity, perhaps in part because
of political manipulation. Regulatory inputs, in contrast, have few substitutes.
58
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Voter j in constituency k is characterized by a policy position Xj, k. Voter j ’s
expected utility from electing candidate i is linear in candidate quality and convex
in the candidate’s distance from the voter’s optimal policy:
Uj, k, i = (Xi − Xj, k ) 2 + θ̂ i, k ,

(A1)

where θ̂ i, k is the voter’s perception of the ability of candidate i in constituency k.
Taking a probabilistic voting approach, the probability that candidate A is elected
is given by
(A2)

P(A wins) = Φ(− (XA − XM, k) 2 + (XB − XM, k) 2 + θ̂ A, k − θ̂ B, k) ,

where Φ( ) is the normal c.d.f. and XM, k is the optimal policy of the median voter in
constituency k. Candidate ability affects success only if the median voter does not
have strong preferences for either party position.
Voters cannot observe a candidate’s θ; they can only see γ · θ , which is the final
value of government inputs received. Voters discount their observation of government inputs received by their prediction γ̂k of how much the governing party has
chosen to favor their constituency:
γk · θI, k
θ̂ I, k = _______ .
γ̂k

(A3)

The party seeks to maximize the probability of reelection, paying a convex cost
of deviating from equal provision of inputs to all constituencies.60 The party’s optimization problem is as follows (assuming A controls the government):
(A4)

K

max

∑ γ αk + P(A wins | γk , XM, k , θ̂A, k , θ̂B, k ),

{γ1, γ2, … , γK} k=1

where 0 < α < 1 , and
(A5)

P(A wins | γk , XM, k , θ̂ A, k , θ̂ B, k )

= Φ(( XB − XM, k ) 2 − ( XA − XM, k ) 2 + θ̂ A, k ( γk ) − θ̂ B, k ( γk )) .

Voters estimate candidate ability as
(A6)

θ̂ i, k ( γk ) =

θi, k ⋅ γk
______

{E(θ )
γ̂k

if i is the incumbent

.

if i is not the incumbent

60
This cost could reflect a preference for citizen welfare, a political cost of appearing to engage in patronage, or
simply an administrative cost of distorting the allocation of inputs from the status quo.
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Denote the median voter’s preference for policy A over policy B as
(A7)

ηk = ( XB − XM, k ) 2 − ( XA − XM, k ) 2.

The first-order condition defines the relationship between the supply of government inputs across two constituencies:
(A8)

∂ θ̂ A, k
∂ θ̂ B, k
+ ϕ(ηk + θ̂ A, k − θ̂ B, k) (______ − ______)
α γ ∗α−1
k
∂ γk
∂ γk
∂ θ̂ A, l _____
∂ θ̂ B, l
_____
̂
̂
= α γ ∗α−1
+
ϕ
η
+
θ
−
θ
−
.
( l
l
A, l
B, l) (
∂γ
∂γ )
l

l

The first term indicates the cost of deviating from equal provision. The density function ϕ indicates the marginal electoral return from getting more votes in constituency k:
if | ηk | is large, then ϕ = 0, and the party cannot affect the outcome in this location. The same quantity of inputs will therefore be provided to all non-swing
constituencies.
The final term indicates the party’s ability to shift voters’ perceptions of the quality difference between the candidates. This depends on incumbency, as government
spending does not affect perceptions of the nonincumbent candidate:
(A9)

θA, k
⎧____
̂ A, k ∂ θ̂ B, k
⎪
∂
θ
γ̂
______ ______
⎨ k
( ∂ γk − ∂ γk ) = ⎪ ____
θB, k
⎩− γ̂k

if A is the incumbent
.
if B is the incumbent

Comparing two ruling party constituencies, we get the expression
(A10)

θA, k
θA, l
α γ ∗α−1
+ ϕk ( · )(____) = α γ ∗α−1
+ ϕk ( · )(____) ,
k
l
γ̂k
γ̂l

indicating that the candidate in an election that is expected to be close (indicated by
a larger value of ϕk ( · ) ) will receive more resources.61 Conversely, comparing two
θ
opposition constituencies, the sign on __
γk changes, and the candidate in the election
expected to be close will receive fewer resources.
Comparing a ruling party constituency and an opposition constituency, we arrive
at the main prediction of the model:
(A11)

θB, l
θA, k
+ ϕ( · )(____) = α γ ∗α−1
+ ϕ( · )(− ____) .
α γ ∗α−1
k
l
γ̂k
γ̂l

61
The model assumes that the parties know well in advance which elections will be close and which will not.
In the empirical section, we assume that the parties are using the closeness of the previous election as a predictor of
the closeness of the next election. Appendix Figure D2 shows empirically that closeness is indeed a good predictor
of future closeness. If parties have other information that would predict which races would be close, they would use
this information as well.
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The ruling party constituency will receive more services than the opposition constituency, but only if one of the two elections is close. The differential is highest if
elections are close in both constituencies.
Note that the voters in this model are fully rational, and they understand that the
party is trying to influence their perceptions of local candidates. In equilibrium,
γ̂k = γ ∗k . In words, voters expect electoral strategy to affect the distribution of government resources, and so they discount the signal received in swing constituencies.
But this discounting does not obviate the need for strategic spending—if the party
delivers a non-distorted amount of resources to a constituency that voters expect to
be favored, then voters’ perceptions of the candidate there will be biased downward.
This result is analogous to the idea that firms may manipulate their earnings reports
upward in equilibrium even if investors are aware that manipulation is taking place.
The model can be generalized to any kind of cost function for deviating from
equal provision of government inputs across constituencies. In the limit where the
party can costlessly reallocate inputs, the party would dedicate zero inputs to opposition constituencies, but continue to give the most inputs to narrowly won ruling
party constituencies.62, 63
Appendix B: Validation of Economic Census
We validated the Economic Census by comparing it to the 2005 Annual Survey
of Industry (ASI). The Economic Census covers all firms in both manufacturing and
services, in both formal and informal sectors. The Annual Survey of Industry covers
the formal manufacturing sector only. Indian law requires an industry to be registered if it has greater than 50 employees, or greater than 10 employees and uses electricity. To achieve a valid comparison, we focused on Economic Census firms with
employment greater than 50.64 We matched these two datasets to the state-industry
level, using National Industrial Classification codes provided in both datasets.
We regressed log total Economic Census employment on log total employment
reported by the Annual Survey of Industries, controlling for log of population to
ensure that we are not just picking up scale effects. Panel A of Table D1 shows results
from this regression at the state level, and panel B shows results from state-industry
level regressions. Columns 3 and 4 have controls for log population. Columns 2 and
4 are weighted by the number of employees in the ASI, to make the estimates representative of the working population. The EC is a very good predictor of ASI under
all specifications at both state and state-industry level. Our preferred specifications
in column 4 have respective state and state-industry coefficients of 0.83 and 0.92,
and R2 values of 0.88 and 0.75.
Figure D1 plots the residual log total employees in the Annual Survey of Industries
on the x-axis and the residual log total employees in the Economic Census on the
62

The model predicts that investment in ruling party constituencies is exactly symmetric with disinvestment
in opposition constituencies. However, the impact of that investment on local growth could be asymmetric, as we
discuss in Section V.
63
Appendix C describes how we can extend this two-party model and empirical strategy to take into account
many parties and dynamic coalitions.
64
Results are nearly identical when using a threshold of ten.
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y-axis. Both of these are residuals after regressing on log state population in 2001.
The first panel does this at the state level; the state employment numbers are very
close to the 45 degree line. The second graph is at the state-industry level; while
there are more mismatches (which we expect are due to narrow misclassification of
industries), the nonparametric best fit on the positive residuals (representing 90 percent of employment in the country) is directly on the 45 degree line. For negative
residuals, the Economic Census reports slightly larger figures than ASI on average,
but still has significant predictive power. The larger counts for the Economic Census
are most likely that it is picking up informal firms that are above the legal registration threshold.
Appendix C: Coalitions and Multiple Candidates
This section describes how we extend the two-party empirical strategy in
Section III to a situation with more than two parties and coalitions that may change
after election results are revealed.
Assume that candidates from N parties contest the election in a given constituency, one of whom is a member of the ruling party. margin is now defined as the
scaled vote distance from the ruling party candidate to the opposition candidate with
the highest number of votes:
(C1)

a
maxn
− vcst
vcst
,
margincst = _________
tot
vcst

maxn
is the vote share of the opposition candidate with the highest number
where vcst
of votes. margin can now be interpreted as the share of votes that would need to
be changed to turn a ruling party constituency into an opposition constituency, or
vice versa. As before, margin is positive for ruling party constituencies, negative for
opposition constituencies, and elections are closest when | margin | is small.
The formation of coalitions presents a potential source of bias to our identification strategy. Coalitions may be formed before or after an election. If a coalition
forms after an election, it is possible that unobserved characteristics of a successful
candidate may affect both her likelihood of joining the governing coalition, and
economic outcomes in her constituency. For example, if small parties with high
ability candidates are more likely to join governing coalitions, equation (3) could
overestimate the ruling party effect.
To eliminate this bias, we define coalitions of parties strictly on the basis of information that was known before an election takes place. In many cases, alliances of
parties are announced in advance; when possible, we define coalitions according
to this information, which we collected from news reports. We then treat coalitions
of parties as a single party. When we are unable to find information on coalitions
before the election, we predict party alliances on the basis of the previous election
in the same state.
In cases where coalitions have shifted during the electoral cycle, this method
may incorrectly label coalition parties as non-coalition, and vice versa. This contaminates the RD design, biasing our estimates toward zero. The bias is most likely
small: we accurately predict candidate ruling party status in 93 percent of cases.
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Appendix D: Additional Figures and Tables
Table D1—Comparisons between 2005 Economic Census and
Annual Survey of Industry

log employment (ASI)
log population
Constant
Observations
R2

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.737
(0.029)

0.924
(0.031)

1.957
(0.284)

0.498
(0.313)

0.668
(0.026)
0.212
(0.042)

−1.178
(0.684)

0.915
(0.031)
0.059
(0.053)

−0.467
(0.930)

1,714
0.47

1,714
0.75

1,714
0.50

1,714
0.75

Notes: The table shows estimates from a regression of log employment in the 2005 Economic
Census on log employment in the 2005 Annual Survey of Industries. A data point is a state-industry
pair. Columns 2 and 4 are weighted by the number of employees in the state-industry bin.
Columns 3 and 4 control for log state population in 2001. Regressions are clustered at the state
level.

Table D2—Placebo Regression Discontinuity Estimates at Sample Quartiles
(1)
Ruling party
Margin of victory
Margin × ruling

0.002
(0.008)
−0.103
(0.212)
0.519
(0.339)

(2)

−0.002
(0.006)
0.047
(0.148)
0.334
(0.284)

Placebo

Low

−0.021
(0.006)
Low

Controls

No

Observations
R2

478
0.12

Baseline

(3)

−0.011
(0.007)
−0.072
(0.157)
0.210
(0.330)

(4)

−0.005
(0.006)
−0.065
(0.155)
0.069
(0.319)

High

−0.017
(0.005)
High

Yes

No

Yes

478
0.26

471
0.13

471
0.28

Notes: The table shows placebo kernel regression discontinuity estimates of equation (3), which
estimates the effect of ruling party politicians on annualized log employment growth. Columns
1 and 2 estimate a discontinuity at the median margin below zero, and columns 3 and 4 estimate
a discontinuity at the median margin above zero. Columns 1 and 3 estimate local linear regressions with state-year fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 add lagged constituency controls. Standard
errors are clustered at the state-time level.
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Table D3—Effect of Ruling Party Status on Growth: Robustness Checks

Ruling party
Margin of victory
Margin × ruling
Baseline

(1)

(2)

0.012
(0.006)
−0.074
(0.176)
−0.007
(0.205)

0.012
(0.005)
−0.089
(0.167)
−0.029
(0.267)
−0.016
(0.004)

(3)

0.014
(0.005)
−0.204
(0.148)
0.145
(0.211)
−0.018
(0.004)

(4)

0.019
(0.008)
−0.326
(0.213)
0.070
(0.254)
−0.017
(0.006)

Observations

682

740

628

368

R2

0.17

0.23

0.25

0.21

Notes: The table shows variants of the main paper specification, equation (3). These are regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of having a ruling party politician on annualized constituency log employment growth. All columns include state-time fixed effects, so constant terms
are not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the state-time level. Column 1 uses actual win
margins of coalition candidates rather than predicted win margins. Column 2 uses actual win
margins and adds elections where prediction quality was poor. Column 3 uses predicted coalitions, the standard specification, but omits states where the coalition has a majority by three seats
or less. Column 4 omits states where the coalition has a majority by ten seats or less.

Table D4—Effect of Ruling Party Status on Growth: Rectangular Kernel
Jobs: Local linear
Ruling party

Lights: Local linear

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.017
(0.005)

0.017
(0.005)

0.033
(0.017)

0.033
(0.016)

−0.362
(0.104)
0.343
(0.160)

−0.304
(0.088)
0.214
(0.156)

−0.713
(0.378)
0.697
(0.538)

−0.820
(0.379)
0.900
(0.503)

State-year fixed effects
Constituency controls

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Yes
No

Observations
R2

768
0.17

742
0.26

2,240
0.48

2,240
0.59

Margin of victory
Margin × ruling
Baseline log employment

−0.020
(0.004)

−0.121
(0.019)

Notes: This table repeats columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 from Table 2, but with a rectangular kernel rather
than a triangular kernel. It shows regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of having a ruling party politician on annualized constituency log employment growth (columns 1–2) and on
change in log average night light emissions over the five years following an election (columns
3–4). Local linear estimates are equally weighted within the optimal bandwidth. All columns
include state-time fixed effects, so constant terms are not displayed. Column 2 adds lagged constituency controls, which are baseline log employment, share of population in rural areas, share
of employment in rural areas, share of agricultural land that is irrigated, rural and urban primary schools, health centers, roads, and electricity connections. Column 4 adds a lagged dependent variable, the only baseline control consistently available across the night light time series.
Standard errors are clustered at the state-time level.
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Table D5—Effect of Ruling Party Status on Growth: Private versus Public (rectangular kernel)
Public sector
(1)
Ruling party
Margin of victory
Margin × ruling
Baseline log public employment

Private sector
(2)

0.013
(0.008)

(3)

0.016
(0.008)

−0.257
(0.267)
0.293
(0.451)

0.019
(0.006)

−0.141
(0.273)
−0.055
(0.409)

0.017
(0.005)

−0.398
(0.108)
0.378
(0.171)

−0.046
(0.014)

Baseline log private employment

(4)
−0.325
(0.090)
0.250
(0.175)
−0.022
(0.004)

State-year fixed effects
Controls

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Observations
R2

768
0.28

742
0.41

768
0.14

742
0.23

Notes: The table presents the same estimates as Table 3, but with a rectangular kernel rather than a triangular kernel.
It shows kernel regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of having a ruling party politician on constituency
log employment growth. The dependent variable in columns 1–2 is log employment growth in public sector firms.
The dependent variable in columns 3–4 is log employment in private sector firms. Standard errors are clustered at
the state-time level. All columns include state-time fixed effects, so constant terms are not displayed.

Table D6—Effect of Ruling Party Status on Growth: Rural Areas Only

Ruling party
Margin of victory
Margin × ruling
Baseline employment
Observations
R2

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.010
(0.004)
0.044
(0.251)
−0.040
(0.316)

0.013
(0.003)
0.034
(0.249)
−0.113
(0.351)
−0.021
(0.003)

0.009
(0.004)

−0.067
(0.050)
0.061
(0.074)

0.010
(0.004)

−0.058
(0.044)
0.018
(0.076)
−0.017
(0.002)

405
0.09

405
0.22

2,082
0.09

2,082
0.17

Notes: This is a reproduction of columns 1–2 and 5–6 of Table 2, but restricts the sample to
employment growth in rural areas. The table shows regression discontinuity estimates of the
effect of having a ruling party politician on annualized constituency log employment growth in
rural areas only. Columns 1–2 present triangular kernel-weighted local linear estimates (equation (3)), and columns 3–4 present full sample polynomial estimates (equation (4)). All columns
include state-time fixed effects, so constant terms are not displayed. Columns 2 and 4 add lagged
constituency controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state-time level.
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Table D7—Effect of Ruling Party Politicians on Rural Public Infrastructure

Ruling party
Margin of victory
Margin × ruling

Roads

Power

Schools

Irrigation

0.004
(0.018)
−0.250
(0.745)
−0.290
(0.849)

0.011
(0.012)
−0.274
(0.432)
−0.093
(0.574)

0.024
(0.021)
0.120
(0.590)
−0.868
(0.896)

−0.002
(0.019)
−1.236
(1.075)
1.049
(1.415)

453
0.82

453
0.85

455
0.61

440
0.60

Observations
R2

Notes: The table shows kernel regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of having a ruling
party politician on changes in the levels of local rural public infrastructure. The dependent variables have been normalized by the baseline level, so the coefficients can be interpreted as standard deviations. The dependent variables represent the (i) share of villages with a paved access
road, (ii) share of villages with an electricity connection, (iii) share of villages with a primary
school, and (iv) share of village land that is irrigated. All regressions are run at the constituency
level, with data aggregated from individual villages. The data sources are the 1991 and 2001
population censuses. All regressions include state-year fixed effects, so constant terms are not
displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level.

Table D8—Effect of Ruling Party Politicians on Urban Public Infrastructure

Ruling party
Margin of victory
Margin × ruling
Observations
R2

Roads

Power

Primary schools

Secondary schools

Hospitals

0.080
(0.156)
0.135
(3.963)
−3.942
(5.623)

0.084
(0.110)
8.295
(3.000)
−16.985
(5.353)

0.004
(0.130)
−0.572
(2.283)
1.616
(3.749)

−0.024
(0.049)
−0.906
(1.918)
3.508
(3.406)

−0.094
(0.220)
1.417
(4.453)
0.704
(5.063)

241
0.75

263
0.78

293
0.82

236
0.82

211
0.55

Notes: The table shows kernel regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of politician ruling party status on
changes in the levels of local urban public infrastructure. The dependent variables have been normalized by the
baseline level, so the coefficients can be interpreted as standard deviations. The dependent variables represent
the following (i) km of paved urban roads, (ii) number of urban electrical connections, (iii) number of primary
schools, (iv) number of secondary schools, and (v) number of hospitals. All regressions are run at the constituency
level, with data aggregated from individual towns. The data sources are the 1991 and 2001 population censuses.
All regressions include state-year fixed effects, so constant terms are not displayed. Standard errors are clustered
at the state-time level.
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Table D9—Effect of Ruling Party Status on Stock Returns:
Placebo Estimates in Nonelection Months
(−6)

(−5)

(−4)

(−3)

(−2)

−0.006
(1.099)

0.438
(0.889)

1.236 −0.953 −0.428
(0.866) (0.892) (1.061)

Ruling party −0.011 −0.040 −0.038
(0.034) (0.028) (0.027)

0.034 −0.014
(0.028) (0.033)

Margin ×
ruling

0.373
(1.202)

Margin of
victory

−0.030
(1.485)

0.344 −0.663
(1.202) (1.169)

(−1)

(1)

(2)

0.025 −0.002 −0.010
(0.034) (0.029) (0.030)

(3)

(4)

0.049 −0.008
0.046
(0.029) (0.031) (0.032)

0.013 −0.101 −1.337 −0.650
(1.090) (0.948) (0.967) (0.932)

1.297 −0.376 −0.474
(1.432) (1.472) (1.285)

(5)

0.611 −0.846
(0.992) (1.044)

1.957 −0.006 −0.924
0.643
(1.308) (1.255) (1.339) (1.411)

Observations

793

793

788

785

781

775

787

788

788

790

788

R2

0.09

0.38

0.16

0.13

0.22

0.15

0.11

0.10

0.12

0.11

0.22

Notes: The table shows placebo regression discontinuity estimates of abnormal returns of publicly traded firms in
nonelection months. The independent variable Ruling party indicates that the winner of the constituency where
the firm’s headquarters are located is a member of the state-level governing coalition after an election at time 0.
Columns indexed by negative numbers indicate abnormal returns in the months before an election. Columns indexed
by positive numbers indicate abnormal returns in months after the election, but exclude the election month, which
is month zero. Returns are measured against a market model with a value-weighted index of Indian securities representing the market, controlling for individual stock betas. All standard errors are clustered at the state-time level.
State-time fixed effects are included in all specifications, so the constant term is not displayed.

Table D10—Effect of Ruling Party Status on Postelection Stock Returns
(rectangular kernel)
Cumulative abnormal
return (CAR)
Ruling party
Margin of victory
Margin × ruling
State-year fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Observations
R2

CAR (placebo)

(1)

(2)

t−1

t−2

0.075
(0.022)
−0.689
(0.575)
−0.371
(0.768)

0.075
(0.036)
−1.097
(1.461)
0.308
(1.449)

−0.024
(0.035)
1.421
(0.466)
−2.190
(0.812)

−0.038
(0.021)
0.954
(0.609)
−0.569
(0.975)

Yes
No
793
0.12

Yes
Yes
615
0.23

Yes
No
793
0.10

Yes
No
793
0.33

Notes: The table shows regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of having a ruling party
politician on the cumulative abnormal returns of firms in the month following an election, with
rectangular kernel weights within the optimal bandwidth. The independent variable Ruling party
indicates that the winner of the constituency in the firm’s headquarter location is a member of a
state-level ruling party. Returns are measured against a market model with a value-weighted index
of Indian securities representing the market, controlling for individual stock betas. Column 1 is
the standard specification with state-time fixed effects. Column 2 adds industry fixed effects. The
final two columns are placebo tests, where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal
return in the month before (column 3) and two months before (column 4) the election. Standard
errors are clustered at the state-time level, and constant terms are omitted due to the fixed effects.
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Table D11—Description of Control Variables
Variable

Source

Rural road
Rural electricity
Rural schools
Irrigation
Urban road count
Urban electricity
Urban primary schools
Urban job share

Description

Population census 1991
Population census 1991
Population census 1991
Population census 1991
Population census 1991
Population census 1991
Population census 1991
Economic census 1990

Share of villages in constituency with paved access roads
Share of villages in constituency with electricity
Share of villages in constituency with primary schools
Share of village land that is irrigated
Average kilometers of paved roads in constituency towns
Average number of electricity connections in constituency towns
Average number of primary schools in constituency towns
Share of constituency jobs that are in towns

Table D12—Effect of Ruling Party Status on Granting of Clearances for Mining
Activities (rectangular kernel)
Permit dummy
Dependent variable
Ruling party
Margin of victory
Margin × ruling
State-election fixed effects
Observations
R2

log permit area granted

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.065
(0.030)

−0.402
(0.554)
−0.093
(0.985)

0.065
(0.027)
0.123
(0.737)
0.633
(0.599)

0.341
(0.153)

−3.030
(2.279)
0.714
(3.657)

0.316
(0.108)

−0.915
(1.775)
3.547
(2.896)

No
352
0.00

Yes
352
0.21

No
352
0.01

Yes
352
0.17

Notes: The table is a version of Table 6, but with rectangular kernel weights instead of triangle
kernel weights. It shows regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of having a ruling party
politician on outcomes related to mining permits. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable
is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a reconnaissance permit, prospecting license, or
mining lease was granted in the constituency during the given electoral cycle. In columns 3 and
4, the dependent variable is the log total area of licenses and leases granted. Standard errors are
clustered at the state-time level. All columns include state-time fixed effects, so constant terms
are not displayed.
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Panel A
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Figure D1. Comparison of Economic Census and Annual Survey of Industry
Notes: The figure plots residual log 2005 economic census employment against residual 2005 Annual Survey of
Industry log total employment. The residuals are from regressions of the variables on log 2001 population. Panel A
shows state totals, while panel B shows state-industry cells with a lowess smoother. Approximately 100 manufacturing industries are covered.
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Win margin (winner minus runner−up)

0.22

0.2

0.18

0.16

0.14

0.12
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

Last electoral term win margin
Figure D2. Win Margin and Reelection Probability
Notes: The y-axis shows the share of constituencies where a candidate from the same party is reelected. The x-axis
shows the win margin of the candidate from this party in the previous election. Each bin shows the mean of a set of
constituencies within the given win margin.

Economic census
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Elections
Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Gujarat
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
West Bengal
Election in sample
Election not in sample
Election census year

Figure D3. Matching Electoral Variables to Economic Census Rounds
Notes: The figure shows the period of years used for construction of variables used from census and electoral data.
The shaded area describes the period of time during which an election is eligible for inclusion in the sample. The
economic census was undertaken in 1990, 1998, and 2005; we look at changes in growth from 1990–1998 and
1998–2005. Elections happen at five-year intervals, with dates staggered across states. We match the first election
in each state that occurred after the baseline observation period. We exclude elections in Uttar Pradesh in 1991 and
2002 because governments were very short-lived. We exclude Assam 1991 because the dominant party was unregistered and ran as independents, making it impossible to identify ruling party membership of politicians. We exclude
Bihar in 2000 because of the large number of postelection coalition changes.
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Figure D4. Balance Tests of Additional Baseline Covariates
Notes: The figures plot the conditional expectation function of baseline constituency characteristics, conditioning on the win margin of the ruling party candidate. Points to the right of zero are seats won by ruling parties,
while points to the left of zero are seats lost by ruling parties. Each point represents approximately 60 observations. A fourth degree polynomial function is fitted separately to each side of 0, with 95 percent confidence intervals displayed.
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Figure D5. Robustness of Employment Effect to Alternate Specifications
Notes: Panel A shows the treatment effect from equation (3) with bandwidths from 1–10 percent of vote share.
Panel B shows the same information using a rectangular kernel in place of the triangular kernel in panel A. In panel
C, the sample is limited to a four-year window of elections instead of the five-year window used in Table 2 and
panel A. Panel D shows the effect of limiting the range of the running variable in the polynomial regression discontinuity specification (equation (4)).
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Panel A. Employment growth
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Figure D6. log Employment Growth versus Win Margin of Ruling Party Candidate
Notes: The figure plots the conditional expectation function of the mean of log employment growth, conditioning
on the win margin of the ruling party candidate. The sample is limited to the optimal bandwidth on the running variable margin of 5.1 percent, which is that used in the main specification of equation (3). Points to the right of zero
indicate growth in locations won by the ruling party candidate, while points to the left of zero indicate growth in
locations lost by the ruling party candidate. There are approximately 38 observations in each bin. A linear function
is fitted separately to each side of 0, and 95 percent confidence intervals are displayed.
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Panel A. Abnormal stock returns
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Figure D7. Stock Return and Mining Clearances versus Win Margin of Ruling Party Candidate
Notes: The figure plots the conditional expectation function of the dependent variable, conditioning on the win
margin of the ruling party candidate. The dependent variable in panel A is monthly abnormal stock return in constituencies that elect ruling party candidates. The dependent in panel B is an indicator that takes the value 1 if a
reconnaissance permit, prospecting license, or mining lease was granted in the constituency during the electoral
cycle. The sample is limited to the optimal bandwidth on the running variable margin of 5.1 percent, which is that
used in the main specification of equation (3). Points to the right of zero indicate outcomes in locations won by the
ruling party candidate, while points to the left of zero indicate outcomes in locations lost by the ruling party candidate. A linear function is fitted separately to each side of 0, and 95 percent confidence intervals are displayed.
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